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Abstract 
Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale – a proof that it is impossible to 
carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-
tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but its unilateral focus 
betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond 
unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for a bilateral cautionary-tale 
view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-
agent relationships and argue that the norm of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to 
agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our novel bilateral cautionary-tale 
formulation extends the normative boundaries of the asymmetric-information stream of agency 
theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact.  
Introduction 
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 Agency theory is a dominant fixture in studies of economic interaction and organisation. 
In essence, it is concerned with investigating “situations in which one individual (the agent) acts 
on behalf of another (the principal) and is supposed to advance the principal’s goals” (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992: 170). Agency theory purports to enable economists to move beyond abstract 
theory and to discuss micro-level issues of internal management and organisation. The analytic 
and rigorous nature of agency theory arguably makes it an attractive tool for decision making in 
complex, practical situations. As a result, the vocabulary of principals and agents, the problems 
of incentives and information, and the challenges of monitoring and evaluating performance 
have been widely applied and debated in many scholarly fields.  
 Social science is historically intertwined with ethics, and ethicists have taken an interest 
in evaluating the application of agency theory to social life. Within the field of business ethics, 
agency theory is a popular target for theorists concerned with the supposed ethical deficits of 
modern capitalist societies. For some business ethicists – let’s call them agency critics – agency 
theory embodies the assumptions that guide the ethics-minimising models of strategic 
management, finance, and corporate governance. For example, agency theory has been singled 
out as the theoretical and ideological bedrock of corporate cultures that foster large-scale 
scandals (Ghoshal 2005; Khurana, 2007; Kulik, 2005). The dominance of agency-theoretic 
economic frameworks in business school curricula has also been criticised (e.g. Ferraro, Pfeffer, 
& Sutton, 2005; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Khurana, Nohria, & Penrice, 2005). More 
fundamentally, ethicists are concerned about the “dangerous and demeaning” game-theoretic 
underpinning of the principal-agent model, which falsely advocates a “monstrous” 
characterisation of human behaviour and rationality (Solomon 1999: 11). The spheres of agency 
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theory and morality have thus been characterised by some business ethicists as mutually 
exclusive, and agency theory has been cast as the villain. 
 In contrast, others have explored whether agency theory can be used in a more 
progressive manner to inform normative considerations in economic and organisational 
interactions. Business ethicists in this camp – let’s call them agency optimists – do not 
categorically reject agency theory, but often criticise and propose revisions to it (e.g. Boatright, 
1999; Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Bowie & Freeman, 1992; Buchanan, 1996; Dees, 1992; 
Donaldson, 2012; Heath, 2009; Husted, 2007; Mitnick, 1992; Orts, 1998). Some agency 
optimists view agency theory as a cautionary tale (Heath, 2009) – a proof that it is impossible to 
carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of moral norms and principles. Let’s 
call this the cautionary-tale view. Agency theory is thus drawn upon not as a straightforward 
positive characterisation of the nature of reality, but as an analytic tool that outlines a cautionary 
tale or an “instructive parable” (Noreen, 1988: 360) of what might happen in the absence of 
ethical behaviour. On this view, moral obligations arising out of agency interactions are 
unilateral – they involve internal constraints adopted by agents against posing risks to principals 
(Buchanan, 1996; Heath, 2006). Tapping into a broadly contractarian take on the relation 
between morality and economic interactions, this view characterises self-interested individuals as 
motivated to follow rules of morality and justice because each is vulnerable to the opportunism 
of others and each stands to benefit from cooperative arrangements (Gauthier, 1986; Hobbes, 
1651/1994).  
 But although the cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative conception of 
agency, it is vulnerable to two criticisms. First, its unilateral focus betrays a descriptively limited 
understanding of the structure of social interaction in principal-agent relationships. Second, 
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cautionary-tale theorists formulate moral obligations unilaterally: as internal constraints on the 
part of one player, the agent, against posing risks to another, the principal. But by attending to 
the moral obligations of only one player in a two-player principal-agent relationship, the 
cautionary-tale view overlooks the bilateral moral considerations relevant to such a social 
interaction. This two-part criticism makes up what we call the problem of unilateralism in 
agency theory. 
 In this article, we address the problem of unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and 
normative argument for a bilateral cautionary-tale view. Descriptively, in order to underscore the 
two-player orientation of agency interactions, we engage with the asymmetric-information 
stream of agency theory. Two bilateral features are discussed: (1) hat swaps, which involve 
agents and principals switching roles back and forth; and (2) role dualism, which involves two 
players posing agency risks to one another in their simultaneous roles as principals and agents. 
(1) has received some attention in the business ethics literature, but remains underdeveloped. (2) 
has yet to be analysed by business ethicists. We refer to these descriptive features as the 
bilateralism thesis. Normatively, we argue that the bilateral structure of moral obligations and 
the norm of reciprocity deserve critical scrutiny in principal-agent relationships. Specifically, the 
article demonstrates that reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in bilateral 
adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems, alongside other organisational responses (e.g. 
incentive design and monitoring). Applied to organisational-level analyses, this appeal to 
reciprocity has attractive managerial implications and potential since the design of principal-
agent relationships can foster the norm of reciprocity.  
Prior cautionary-tale theorists have defined ethics as a response to agency risks (e.g. 
Buchanan, 1996; Heath, 2006), but have not engaged with the thesis of bilateralism or the 
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problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Other agency optimists have called for a 
bilateral moral evaluation (e.g. Dees, 1992; Donaldson, 2012) within broader critical debates on 
agency theory, but have not engaged with or developed a bilateral formulation. Some optimists 
have engaged with asymmetric-information problems (Husted, 2007), but have done so 
unilaterally. Still others have reexamined the theory of the firm stream of agency theory in 
broadly bilateral terms – by highlighting the legal principles of authority, power, and hierarchy 
(Orts, 1998), and by revising the assumption of bounded self-interest in light of empirical 
research on reciprocity (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). In contrast, our novel bilateral formulation of 
the cautionary-tale view extends the normative boundaries of the asymmetric-information stream 
of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact. 
Setting aside the interesting but contentious debates over the role of authority or power in 
economic debates of agency, we engage with the asymmetric-information stream of agency 
theory. By offering a socially informed understanding of principal-agent relationships, the 
bilateral cautionary-tale view underscores the structure of reciprocal, as opposed to merely 
unilateral, deontic constraints in social and economic agency relationships.  
The article begins with an overview of the cautionary-tale view and its salient unilateral 
features (I). Next, we criticise descriptive unilateralism and introduce two bilateral principal-
agent features: hat swaps and role dualism (II). Finally, we discuss the normative significance of 
the bilateral cautionary-tale view before considering some potential objections (III). 
I. Agency Theory and Unilateralism  
The literature on agency theory is vast and multidisciplinary. It is not possible to do 
justice to all agency approaches here or review the various controversies, misunderstandings, and 
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abuses in the definitional literature. The following selective overview of some of agency theory’s 
prominent ancestry (Mitnick, 1992) provides the relevant foundation for our purpose.  
One long-standing interest in agency is closely connected with the theory of the firm. The 
theory of the firm literature involves distinct interpretations and approaches (e.g. transaction 
cost, contract, property, employment), but its essential concern is the proper role of firms in 
markets. Some agency theorists aim to draw on this theory of the firm as a positive approach for 
analysing economic activities within the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). A second stream of agency theory focuses on problems of asymmetric-
information and risk in market interactions, broadly construed (Arrow, 1963; 1985; Knight, 
1921; Ross, 1973). In comparison to the largely empirical and non-mathematical agency 
literature on the theory of the firm, the asymmetric-information literature is often non-empirical 
and formal, and draws on game theory and probability. As prior business ethicists have 
acknowledged, the game-theoretic/asymmetric-information approach is distinct from and much 
broader than the theory of the firm stream, dealing with any interaction between two individuals, 
irrespective of organisational variables, whereby one tries to “influence” the actions of the other 
(Heath, 2009: 499; Mitnick, 1992: 79-81). These two streams of agency are in turn distinct from 
the legal approach to agency, which assigns agency a narrower meaning, informed by notions 
such as authority, delegation, and liability (Clark, 1985; Orts, 1996).  
a. The Cautionary-Tale View  
Some business ethicists view agency theory as a dystopian “state of nature” thought 
experiment that enables us to formulate moral considerations for guiding social and economic 
interactions (Buchanan, 1996; Heath, 2006; Noreen, 1988). Agency theory is thus studied as a 
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cautionary tale; this view does not draw on agency theory as a strictly positive theory, pace the 
theory of the firm stream of agency. This means that cautionary-tale theorists do not assert that 
individuals behave opportunistically, for example. Instead they ask: what if it were true that 
everyone behaved opportunistically and acted according to an instrumental model of rationality? 
The positive approach to agency theory is thus drawn upon as a conditional: if certain 
assumptions about opportunism, sequential rationality, and expected utility maximisation hold, 
then agency theory can act as a “critical-diagnostic” (Heath, 2009: 497) deductive tool that 
identifies the points at which economic interactions are vulnerable to breaking down in the 
absence of moral norms and principles.ii  
To be clear, the cautionary-tale view is neither a positive theory nor a normative theory. 
Instead, this view draws upon agency theory in order to provide “a series of instructive parables 
that illustrate the adverse consequences on social and economic systems of unconstrained 
opportunistic behavior” (Noreen, 1988: 360, italics ours). This instructive parable may (but need 
not) inform normative considerations in the principal-agent relationship. The instrumental (or 
“economic”) model of rationality at the core of agency theory has long been used in political 
philosophy as a basis for the development of normative theory (e.g. Braybrooke, 1976; Gauthier, 
1986; Heath, 1996). If we suppose that certain background assumptions of rational-choice theory 
about the world are true, then in the imaginary world of the thought experiment, the “nasty, 
brutish, and short” nature of social interactions is a proof of the need for normative principles 
and moral constraints (Hobbes, 1651/1994).  
Agency theory’s instrumental conception of rationality is thus used to construct a 
cautionary tale that allows us to “state with a great degree of precision what would happen in the 
absence of morality” (Heath, 2009: 518). For example, analysing the prevalent agency risks can 
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shed light on and inform the implicit and explicit moral codes and principles that guide 
bureaucratic organisations (Buchanan, 1996: 422). According to the cautionary-tale view, agency 
theory is an analytic method that identifies “major stress lines” and potential future “cracks” 
within economic interactions; organisational ethical codes are then analysed “as the glue that (to 
a greater or lesser degree of success) holds things together” (Heath, 2009: 520; referring to 
Buchanan, 1996).  
b. Salient Unilateral Features 
Descriptively, principal-agent relationships are often characterised unilaterally: agents 
carry out certain tasks on behalf of principals, not the other way around. The unilateral focus is 
commonplace in foundational texts on agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Here, the structure of 
interactions is “top-down”, and “sanctions flow from the principal, who occupies a higher rank in 
the organisational hierarchy, down towards the agent, who occupies a subordinate role” (Heath, 
2009: 516). Ethical principles in this top-down organisational setting express “commitments on 
the part of agents to reduce risks” that they impose to principals (Buchanan, 1996: 422). Some 
common agency risks are: inefficient use of resources (e.g. wastefulness), misappropriation of 
resources (e.g. embezzlement), passive opposition (e.g. stalling), and shirking (Buchanan, 1996: 
425-426).  
Given this unilateral stance, moral obligations in the cautionary tale view are formulated 
unilaterally on the part of only one of the players (the agent) in any given interaction. So, if 
player 1 (the agent) poses a risk to player 2 (the principal), then cautionary tale theorists study 
the obligations owed by player 1 to player 2 to avoid opportunism. The normative essence of 
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agency, according to this line of argument, involves abating the agency risks that are posed by 
agents to principals. Proponents thus characterise the cautionary-tale view simply as “the agency 
risk minimisation” theory of business ethics (Buchanan, 1996: 436; Heath, 2006: 23). The 
“function” of ethics here is to “reduce” agency risks, and moral obligations are a response to 
agency risks (Buchanan, 1996, 419). For example, loyalty to the chain of command constitutes a 
“central obligation” (Heath, 2006: 23) within firms, and the principle of stewardship is an 
“ethical commitment” which works to “counter pressures of self-interest” that might otherwise 
lead to behaviours such as embezzlement (Buchanan, 1996: 427).  The analysis of agency risks 
and the related moral obligations is a key to understanding and informing many real-world moral 
codes and norms that implicitly or explicitly structure organisational interactions. 
 In this manner, the structure of agency risks and moral obligations in the cautionary-tale 
view is unilateral. In relation to player 1’s unilateral obligation of loyalty, for example, there is 
no discussion of player 2’s correlative obligations to provide, say, job security. Here, moral 
obligations are “deontic” (Heath, 2006: 23) constraints that guide what agents ought to do – what 
they are morally required, forbidden, or permitted to do – when engaging with principals. If 
agents remain loyal or avoid misappropriation of resources, even when they can renege and cheat 
without getting caught, then the deontic constraints are “internal” (Buchanan, 1996: 423). 
Internal constraints, or ethical commitments, contrast with external constraints such as pecuniary 
incentives in the form of bonuses or fines.  
What is the content of moral obligations, according to the cautionary-tale approach? This 
article does not comment on the normative content or the “inner morality” (Fuller, 1964) of 
agency interactions, nor does it take a position regarding the justifiability of moral obligations in 
the cautionary-tale approach. In other words, we do not identify or catalogue specific obligations 
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or provide an account of why they arise. That debate is important, but due to a number of 
established difficulties and hurdles (see Donaldson, 2012; and Boatright’s 2007 critique of van 
Oosterhout et al, 2006), it merits separate attention. Our purpose is more minimalist and pertains 
to the structure within which norms and obligations arise and are formulated; specifically, we 
discuss in this article who owes obligations to whom.   
 To recap, according to the cautionary-tale view, agency relationships are unilateral and 
one-way, with risks posed from only one individual, the agent, to the other, the principal. At the 
same time, unilateralism is a normative feature of the cautionary-tale view. Moral obligations 
arising in these agency interactions involve unilateral commitments on the part of agents against 
posing risks to principals. This unilateral stance is vulnerable to a descriptive and normative 
criticism. In section II, we present a descriptive argument for a bilateral cautionary-tale view. We 
then turn to discussing the normative features of the bilateral cautionary-tale view in section III. 
II. A Descriptive Argument for Bilateralism 
 Recall that the cautionary-tale view is formulated as a conditional – that is, as an 
instructive parable, as opposed to a factual statement about the nature of reality. This diagnostic 
tool thus outlines the states of affairs that would come about if certain positive propositions were 
to hold. The stream of agency theory we draw on in order to criticise the unilateral formulation 
of the cautionary-tale view is the game-theoretic, asymmetric-information approach. We believe 
the two-player orientation of the asymmetric-information approach enable it to nicely exhibit 
certain bilateral features. Methodologically, given its abstract, non-empirical features, the 
asymmetric information approach is well-suited for testing out revisions and theoretical 
boundary-setting exercises in agency theory (Jensen, 1983).iii To set the stage for our argument 
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and avoid definitional confusion, we provide a basic definitional discussion of the asymmetric-
information stream of agency theory. 
a. The Asymmetric-Information Approach to Agency 
 According to the asymmetric-information approach to agency theory (Arrow, 1985; Ross, 
1973), agency problems involve the microeconomic game-theoretic analysis of interactions 
between principals and agents. The core element of this definition is the presence of two or more 
individuals.iv Here, the informed party is the agent, the party that lacks critically relevant 
information is the principal, and agents act on behalf of principals. The problem of agency 
becomes theoretically interesting in this context in the presence of uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, goal incongruity, and agent risk aversion. Agency theory highlights fundamental 
problems in economic interactions that are not explicitly addressed by other theoretical 
approaches: given the assumptions of asymmetric-information, divergent objectives, and 
rampant opportunism, agency theory elegantly depicts a world in which perfect policing and 
governance are impossible, despite the presence of intricate monitoring measures and incentive 
design. The two parties agree on a fee schedule to be paid to the agent, and any choice made by 
the agent affects the welfare of both the agent and the principal. Contractual remedies can be 
negotiated before principals and agents join a given agreement (ex ante) and after they have 
joined a contract (ex post). Ex ante remedies address adverse selection problems, while ex post 
remedies respond to moral hazard problems.  
 For example, consider a tenancy interaction in the commercial leasing market and in 
particular the operation of an indoor shopping mall. Two parties within this sector are the mall 
managers that lease, administer, and maintain the space, and the retailers that lease the units. 
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Consider the interaction from the viewpoint of mall management. Prior to signing the lease, 
managers are the uninformed party, and the prospective retailer has access to private 
information. Adverse-selection problems may arise: managers may struggle to evaluate the 
suitability of retailers for a unit, given the limited information regarding the retailer’s level of 
experience, financial condition, and interest in remaining for the long term. If the lease contract 
is signed, moral-hazard problems may arise: Without regular inspections, managers may find it 
difficult to observe or evaluate how well the retailer adheres to the mall’s many operating 
standards (e.g. regarding cleaning, music, signage, storefront and in-store displays) which 
contribute to the mall’s profitability goals. The mall managers depend on this division of labour 
and would not be able to operate every retail store and maintain comparable profitability 
thresholds on their own. Here, the mall managers can be seen as seeking to influence the 
behaviour of retailers, for example through specific incentives or monitoring mechanisms. In 
both moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems, the risks of agency are posed unilaterally: the 
agent (the retailer) poses agency risks to the principal (the mall managers).  
It may be objected that this example is not an illustration of a principal-agent 
relationship. Rather, it appears to be a contractual transaction that has an asymmetric-information 
element. Just because the two parties make promises to one another, the objection goes, it does 
not mean that the two are in an agency relationship. According to a legal understanding of 
agency, for example, this definitional stance conflicts with the essential firm-level, legal 
relationships of authority and hierarchy. Theory of the firm agency theorists may also question 
whether the mall example counts as an instance of proper delegation. The worry here may be that 
the boundaries of this contractual interaction have been overly extended so as to strip it of 
agency theoretic significance.  
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In response, we remind readers that the theoretical boundaries of agency relations are not 
one and the same across the law of agency, theory of the firm, and asymmetric-information 
agency streams. Further, the proper theoretical scope and nature of agency relationships is an 
ongoing, contentious matter of debate in the multi-disciplinary literature on agency theory. In the 
asymmetric-information agency stream, the goals or interests of two parties are incongruent, and 
interactions occur under conditions of uncertainty and information asymmetry. The informed 
party is the agent, the uniformed party is the principal, and the principal seeks to influence the 
agent’s actions. It is not necessary that one party employ the other, and no assumptions are made 
regarding the structure of authority or the presence of discretion and fiduciary obligations 
(Salanié, 1997; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Although the asymmetric-information approach 
does not focus on specific organisational structures and addresses decision-theoretic variables 
instead, it is an established, valuable theoretical tool for representing the state of technical 
competence in formalising agency problems. It is within this analytic lens that we suggest 
business ethicists observe the bilateral features of agency. Whether this suggestion is applicable 
or fruitful in other streams of agency is beyond the scope of this article.   
Given this understanding of asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships, in the 
remainder of this section we discuss two bilateral features of agency relationships: hat swaps and 
role dualism. As we argue, the roles that players fulfill as principals and agents deserve critical 
scrutiny from business ethicists. 
b. Hat Swaps 
 The asymmetric-information approach to agency defines the uninformed party as the 
principal and the informed party as the agent. However, while the threat of asymmetric 
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information may be posed by the agent to the principal, the agency roles of individuals can shift 
within a single relationship.  
 Consider the commercial leasing interaction above, but from the point of view of the 
retailer as opposed to the mall managers. Prior to the start of a leasing arrangement, the retailer is 
the uninformed party, whereas the mall managers have access to private information about the 
units. Adverse-selection problems arise if the mall misrepresents the physical condition of the 
unit during the pre-contract viewing process. Here, the risk is posed by the mall’s management 
(agent) to the retailer (principal), who does not have access to private information regarding the 
true state of the property. Moral-hazard problems may also arise if the managers neglect to carry 
out contracted obligations of care after the retailer moves in (e.g. tardy attendance to routine 
repairs), or imposes unexpected assessments for major repairs or maintenance, such as repaving 
the parking lots. Here, the agent (the mall managers) may be seen as acting on behalf of the 
principal (the retailer), in so far as the retailer would not be able to operate at the same threshold 
of profitability on its own in the absence of this division of labour. In both moral-hazard and 
adverse-selection problems, the risks of agency are posed unilaterally – the agent (the mall 
managers) poses agency risks to the principal (the retailer).   
 Asymmetric-information thus arises on both sides of a commercial leasing relationship: 
agency risks are posed by the retailer to the mall’s management, and also by the mall’s 
management to the retailer, each of whom may wear the principal’s hat or the agent’s hat in 
different domains—that is, in different aspects or facets—of the relationship. For example, 
parties to a commercial lease will find themselves interacting in various domains, such as 
finances, major maintenance, day-to-day operations, seasonal promotions, etc. Each party may 
be informed in a given realm, and pose risks to the uninformed other. The other, at the same 
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time, might possess private information about some other domain, and so pose a different set of 
risks back to the first party. This involves recognising that an agency contract is a complex and 
multifaceted social interaction. A single contract can include differing sets of risks arising from 
different domains, posed from player 1 to player 2 and from player 2 to player 1. Since both 
players wear the principal’s hat in different domains in this interaction, this relationship is not 
unilateral.  
 The phenomenon of hat swaps remains underdeveloped in the literature on business 
ethics.v One source of confusion may be definitional. The relation between agency and 
“employment” corresponds to a key distinction between the current asymmetric-information and 
theory of the firm streams of agency theory. Some in the latter stream take it for granted that 
principals “employ” (e.g. Bosse & Phillips, 2016) agents in agency relations, whereas the former 
defines agency relations separately from individual organisational functions (Husted, 2007; 
Salanié, 1997). If the roles of principals and employers were necessarily one and the same, then 
the notion of hat swaps could not get off the ground. However, since we engage with the 
asymmetric-information stream of agency, the roles of principals and agents are interchangeable 
between two players. By moving beyond the theory of the firm stream, our socially informed 
reexamination of agency theory has the potential to be applied to different kinds of 
organisational/structural settings and to diverse employment arrangements in future research.  
 It may be objected that the relation of agency actually remains unilateral in the 
commercial leasing example. In both the moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems, prior to 
and after signing the lease agreement, the agent by definition poses the risk because she is the 
informed player in an asymmetric-information scenario. According to this view, agency in this 
example is not bilateral, but rather a series of interactions in different unilateral domains. This is 
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a legitimate, technical stance, but it overlooks an essential social feature of the relationship. If 
player 1 poses a unilateral risk to player 2 in one domain, and player 2 poses a unilateral risk to 
player 1 in another domain within the same two-person relationship, arguably this interaction is 
no longer unilateral, even when the two-player game formally ends after a single iteration. In our 
example, the implication of the hat swap is that both the mall management and the retailers have 
a chance to play the role of agent and pose risks to the other. 
The implications of hat swaps deserve attention, especially given the normative 
implications of role shifts among agents and principals. A number of agency optimists have been 
calling for an analysis of the moral obligations of principals (e.g. Dees, 1992; Donaldson, 2012) 
in principal-agent relationships. According to the cautionary-tale view, moral obligations are by 
definition formulated on the part of agents. However, although moral obligations would be 
assigned to agents in the cautionary-tale view, hat swaps provide a necessary step for considering 
bilateral moral considerations on the part of both players in a given principal-agent relations.  
c. Role Dualism 
A second descriptive bilateral feature of principal-agent relationships is what we call role 
dualism. Here, each player is both principal and agent in the same agency relationship and in the 
same domain. In contrast, in hat swaps, each player is both principal and agent in relation to the 
same counterpart but in different domains. In the commercial leasing example, the retailer may 
act opportunistically regarding payment interactions (by stretching the payment terms), and the 
mall management may act opportunistically regarding maintenance interactions (by being slow 
to repair things). The retailer and mall manager swap hats here. The retailer wears the agent’s hat 
during the payment interaction, but wears the principal’s hat during the maintenance interaction. 
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Now consider a variation of the commercial leasing example – a joint project – to 
demonstrate role dualism. A sports retailer in the mall wants to put in a parkour facility, which is 
financially beyond their reach. The retailer presents a formal proposal to the mall managers. The 
managers believe this facility could be a real draw, and so the two contemplate a joint agreement 
in which they will share the construction costs. Any number of scenarios could result, but 
consider just this one: might the retailer intentionally underestimate costs, and when the project 
goes over budget try to foist the remaining costs onto the mall management? Alternatively, the 
mall managers might intentionally do the same, such that once the project is under way they will 
“plead poverty” and try to foist the remaining costs onto the retailer. Both parties have to 
consider the possibility of finding themselves with a half-completed project, substantial sunk 
costs, and an ugly stand-off. Either might then have to pony up the funds that the other party is 
refusing to pay, or let the unfinished project sit idle while enduring a protracted legal battle with 
an uncertain outcome. In this adverse-selection scenario, both parties play the role of agents with 
regard to construction costs. They are both defined as agents in the information-asymmetry 
approach, because each is the informed party who carries out tasks on behalf of the other 
uninformed party.  
 Role dualism has received attention in the economics literature as the “double-sided” or 
“two-sided” agency problem. As in the parkour example, double-sided adverse selection can 
arise for both players prior to agreeing to a contract (Soberman, 1997). Moral hazard becomes 
double-sided when each player takes actions unobserved by the other, and these actions affect 
the pay-offs for both players (Rasmusen, 1994: 202). In both agency problems, the output of the 
principal-agent interaction depends on the combined efforts of two input providers – the 
principal and the agent (Roussey & Soubeyran, 2011: 2).  
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 Many important asymmetric-information agency problems are two-sided. Consider some 
examples: the global financial crisis (Mishra, 2010), professional services (Sharma, 1997), firm-
level profit-sharing schemes (Chang, Lai, & Lin, 2003), outsourcing (Elitzur, Gavious, & 
Wensley, 2012), insurance markets (Seog, 2010; Soberman, 1997), franchising (Rubin, 1978), 
sharecropping (Reid, 1977), product warranties (Dybvig & Lutz, 1993), headquarter-subsidiary 
relations (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015), joint production projects (Kim & Wang, 1998), 
management consulting and money-back contracts (Mann & Wissink, 1990), vertical contracting 
(Romano, 1994); commercial leasing (Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, 1995), and efficiency wages 
in litigation (Gürtler & Kräkel, 2008). Although the two-sided agency problem has been known 
to economists for some time, to our knowledge, it has yet to receive attention in the literature in 
business ethics, and its intriguing social and/or normative implications remain unexplored.  
 In sum, the descriptive account of the cautionary-tale view must be amended in light of 
two descriptive features of asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships: a) hat swaps, 
in which each player might play the role of agent and principal in different domains of the 
agency relationship; and b) role dualism, in which moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems 
are posed by each player to the other in the same domain. Together, these two descriptive 
features establish a socially informed understanding of the asymmetric-information theory of 
agency that is structurally bilateral. We refer to this argument as the bilateralism thesis. 
 Recall that we set out to address the problem of unilateralism through a descriptive and 
normative argument. A descriptive argument for bilateralism has been presented in section II. 
We now turn to the second, normative argument.  
III. A Normative Argument for Bilateralism 
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 The standard cautionary tale view is in effect an agency risk reduction theory of business 
ethics. Its essential features are loyalty and moral commitment to a hierarchical chain of 
command. To be sure, cautionary tale theorists do not claim to address more than a small part of 
a complete conception of morality through agency theory (Buchanan, 1996; Heath, 2006). We 
may wonder, however, whether the cautionary tale view can provide additional moral insight 
beyond a unilateral conception of morality. 
Alongside a unilateral descriptive stance, moral obligations in the cautionary-tale view 
have so far been formulated unilaterally – as commitments on the part of one party, the agent, 
against posing agency risks to the other, the principal (section I). According to the bilateralism 
thesis (section II), a socially informed understanding of the structure of asymmetric-information 
principal-agent relationships must acknowledge agency hat swaps and role dualism. Moral 
obligations arising in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships can thus be 
formulated not just unilaterally, but also bilaterally, as responses on the part of both players to 
agency risks. If one is convinced about the theoretical attraction of the cautionary tale view and 
its parsimonious engagement with an instrumental model of rationality, then there is reason to 
welcome such a bilateral reexamination. As we argue next, within this bilateral structure, the 
norm of reciprocity, conceived as the practice of exchanging with others for mutual benefit, can 
operate as a solution to agency risks in moral hazard and adverse selection problems.  
a. Moral Hazard and Reciprocity 
 Consider the mall commercial leasing example again. Maintaining cleanliness standards 
helps keep the space free from insects, mould, and common allergens such as dust. To save time 
and effort, some retailers may be tempted to cut corners in upholding these standards. This 
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constitutes a moral-hazard risk posed from the retailer to the mall. According to the cautionary-
tale approach, moral obligation on the part of managers would involve adopting internal, deontic 
constraints and adhering to cleanliness standards irrespective of the presence of incentives or 
monitoring mechanisms. At the same time, the mall management could pose an agency risk to 
the retailers if the mall management does not maintain cleanliness standards in the mall’s 
common spaces. In response to this risk, ethical behaviour would involve deontic constraints on 
the part of the mall’s managers to maintain the mall’s common areas. This example involves role 
dualism.  
 Now let’s embed this interaction in a longer-term, repeat-game structure. Suppose mall 
managers and retailers sign a five-year contract. In this two-sided agency setting, risks flow 
bilaterally between the mall managers and retailers. Ethical behaviour on the part of each player 
would involve meeting cleanliness standards, though early on in the relationship effort levels and 
quality of cleaning may not be readily observable by the other. At the end of year 1, however, 
suppose both players’ performance is more readily observable, since the physical space 
deteriorates with the passage of time. Mall managers may not keep their end of the agreement in 
year 2 if retailers have not kept theirs in year 1. In turn, mall managers may have reasons to work 
harder to keep their end of the agreement in year 2, if retailers keep their end of the bargain well 
in year 1. The norm of reciprocity in this context involves the retailers reciprocating the 
cooperative gesture of mall managers when they provide a clean space, and vice versa, even 
though both parties could have cut corners in ways that would be difficult for the other to 
perceive or evaluate in the short term. Reciprocity in repeat games can thus function as a solution 
to agency risks, since each player knows that a cooperative gesture can elicit in-kind reciprocal 
reactions from other players in the future.  
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 In this example, bilateral moral hazard problems arose with respect to the same domain – 
cleanliness standards. Now consider that the mall managers and retailers may be, at the same 
time, in other moral hazard problems in different domains. For example, retailers may have 
access to private information regarding their ability to fulfill their financial commitments, as well 
as their true efforts in promoting mall-wide seasonal promotions. Thus, even without a multi-
year relationship, the social implications of a multitude of risks and moral hazard problems is 
that each player’s deontic commitments in one domain might be reciprocated by the other player 
in a different domain. 
b. Adverse Selection and Reciprocity 
Agency risks and moral obligations in adverse-selection scenarios also flow bilaterally. 
Consider the joint project parkour example. The mall managers and retailers are each uninformed 
with respect to one domain – for example, the ability of the other to afford the construction costs 
– prior to entering the agency interaction. In this double-sided adverse selection setting, in 
response to agency risks, each party might adopt internal constraints against underestimating or 
misrepresenting construction costs. Recognising the presence of this double-sided structure, mall 
managers and retailers may conceivably appeal to a quid-pro-quo structure – they may each 
adopt moral constraints. In this context, reciprocity can operate as a solution to agency risks in an 
adverse selection problem. This can happen when in-kind reciprocal reactions are carried out 
within the same one-shot interaction in different domains, or when such interactions occur over 
repeat interactions. This is because alongside role dualism with respect to parkour construction 
costs, the mall managers and retailers take part in a series of alternative interactions in other 
domains (e.g. unexpected large-scale maintenance). In anticipation of a broadly cooperative 
social relationship, then, a player in one principal-agent domain may adopt reciprocal moral 
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constraints against posing adverse selection risks, and these constraints may be reciprocated by 
the other player in a different domain.   
In sum, embedding transactions in implicit or explicit single-iteration or long-term 
structures of reciprocity can serve as a solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-
hazard problems. Not all principal-agent relationships are bilateral, but in those that are (or can 
be designed to be), moral solutions and the norm of reciprocity merits attention alongside other 
agency theoretic mechanisms.vi  
Our discussion of reciprocity as a moral solution might seem overly optimistic regarding 
the players’ trust in one another to reciprocate cooperative commitments. It might appear that we 
believe players will necessarily respond to cooperative gestures in kind, as opposed to taking 
advantage of others. But in fact we are making a different claim: if a player knows about the 
possibility of reciprocity, whether through multiple iterations of interaction or through multiple 
domains of cooperative interactions, then agents might reciprocate through unilateral deontic 
constraints within a quid-pro-quo cooperative structure. This is not to say that people can or will 
in fact act in this manner. Rather, players may choose to adopt deontic constraints that enable 
cooperation, even though they could choose to act opportunistically; each might recognise their 
vulnerability to the other’s reneging and also the benefits of positive reciprocation (see Gauthier, 
1986 for this line of argument outside the purview of agency theory). If actors have an altruistic, 
socially oriented affinity for trust and justice, then of course the reciprocal structure attains even 
further strength and robustness, but the point is that such enlightened assumptions are not 
necessary for the cautionary-tale argument to work.  
 23 
We do not make the (mistaken) assumption that moral solutions to agency problems are 
always beneficial, or that they are necessarily more effective than other organisational solutions. 
We also do not claim that moral solutions are ever a complete or stand-alone solution to agency 
problems. After all, the reason agency theory is theoretically interesting is that it elegantly 
depicts a world where perfect policing and governance are impossible, despite the presence of 
intricate solutions. Norms do merit more attention than many business ethicists have thus far 
acknowledged, however, since they operate and interact with other organisational mechanisms 
like monitoring and incentive design. In adverse selection problems, standard organisational 
solutions include signalling and screening mechanisms; in moral hazard problems, monitoring or 
incentives are common organisational solutions (Rasmusen, 1994). Moral solutions may operate 
in conjunction with these existing mechanisms. In the mall example, reciprocity would work in 
conjunction with incentive arrangements that give a break on rent in exchange for maintaining 
high cleaning standards, for instance. 
While reciprocity is an important, potential moral solution, it also has certain weaknesses. 
Crucially, the quid pro quo structure of bilateral obligations in asymmetric-information principal-
agent relationships also leaves open the possibility for individuals to reciprocate negatively. 
Negative reciprocity involves neglectful behaviour in return for (or in revenge for) uncooperative 
behaviour. Players who perceive or experience cooperative treatment in a given principal-agent 
interaction may reward this treatment through positively reciprocal behaviours; players who 
perceive or experience non-cooperative treatment in a given interaction often punish that 
behaviour through negatively reciprocal behaviours, even though this poses costs to themselves 
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009). If the norm of negative reciprocity 
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kicks in, this can exacerbate agency risks and make the agency problem doubly complicated. So 
the costs of (negative) reciprocity also deserve attention. 
c. Normative Cash-Value  
 To recap, according to the cautionary-tale view, agency theory is an instructive parable 
that can inform ethical principles and norms as a response to agency risk. However, the 
cautionary-tale view is vulnerable to two criticisms. First, a unilateral focus betrays a 
descriptively limited understanding of the structure of social interaction in principal-agent 
relationships. Second, the unilateral moral formulation of obligations overlooks bilateralism and 
the norm of reciprocity in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships. As we have 
demonstrated, the norm of reciprocity can operate as a moral solution and a response to agency 
risks in moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems alongside other organisational remedies 
such as incentive design and monitoring.   
 Conceiving of reciprocity as a bilateral response to agency risks is a novel feature of our 
formulation of the cautionary-tale view. Previously, the cautionary-tale view has defined ethics 
in agency theory as a response to agency risks, but has not engaged with the asymmetric-
information features of moral hazard and adverse selection or with the bilateralism thesis. 
Outside the cautionary-tale view, Husted (2007) has formulated moral solutions to moral-hazard 
and adverse-selection problems, but he does not engage with the bilateralism thesis, and so 
discusses only those moral solutions that engage one player in a given two-player interaction. 
Descriptively, our bilateral formulation of the cautionary tale view can capture the socially 
relevant features of hat swaps and role dualism, which are underdeveloped in the business ethics 
literature. Normatively, the shift to bilateralism means analysing not just one set of moral 
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constraints on the part of one of the two players in a given interaction. The socially informed 
bilateral stance can capture deontic constraints on the part of both players in a given principal-
agent relationship. This opens the possibility for the norm of reciprocity in single or repeat game 
interactions. Note that although this normative stance moves beyond loyalty and commitment to 
the chain of command, the implication of this move is minimalist. The claim is not that the 
bilateral cautionary-tale view necessarily serves purposes that go beyond promoting cooperative, 
mutually beneficial relationships. Rather, by offering a socially informed understanding of 
principal-agent relationships, this view can underscore the structure of reciprocal, in addition to 
merely unilateral, deontic constraints in agency relationships.  
 Agency optimists have been making gestures towards a bilateral formulation of agency 
theory for some time. Outside the cautionary-tale approach, Perrow (1986) has criticised agency 
theory for neglecting the risks posed by principals (e.g. lying about profit levels, failing to 
disclose threats of lost business). In response to such risks, Dees (1992) and Donaldson (2012) 
have argued that moral obligations should flow from principals and agents, though a bilateral 
argument for supporting this stance has been previously unavailable. Orts (1998) has insightfully 
analysed the problems of shirking and sharking by drawing on the legal constructs of authority, 
power, and hierarchy to inform the theory of the firm stream of agency. Our bilateral cautionary-
tale view enables us to discuss descriptive and normative features of bilateralism, and to 
demonstrate the role of reciprocity as a possible solution to agency risks in the asymmetric-
information stream of agency theory, without engaging with debates surrounding the role of 
authority in the theory of the firm or the legal stream of agency theory.  
Other agency optimists have successfully argued for a role for reciprocity in agency 
theory (Bosse & Phillips, 2016), but this is accomplished by revising a key assumption 
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underlying agency theory – the assumption of bounded self-interest. While plenty of empirical 
evidence indicates the presence of the norm of reciprocity as an underlying motivational 
assumption,vii and while we applaud these developments, we do not need to draw on these 
findings. This is because the cautionary-tale view already acknowledges that bounded self-
interest is not a necessary assumption in agency theory. According to this view, standard 
assumptions of agency theory are a hypothetical possibility in an instructive parable, as opposed 
to a positive statement about the nature of reality. Nevertheless, by drawing attention to the 
bilateralism thesis, by arguing for enhanced social investigation of the descriptive features of 
agency theory, and by extending the normative boundaries of principal-agent relationships, this 
article carries out a broadly progressive, agency optimist goal.  
Three outstanding objections now require attention, and we turn to these in the final 
subsection of the article. 
d. Objections  
 The first objection pertains to the relevance of reciprocity to principal-agent relationships. 
For some, each player in a reciprocal two-person interaction cooperates with the expectation that 
doing so might induce the other player to cooperate again in the next round of interactions. Here, 
the person to whom we supply a benefit is the same person from whom we expect to receive 
benefits.viii Moreover, according to this view, benefits from others are received within the same 
domain in which benefits are supplied. For example, in an intra-firm setting, internal constraints 
of loyalty on the part of player 1 (the employee), may be met by correlative obligations of loyalty 
on the part of player 2 (the owner) regarding job security. These two obligations occur in the 
same domain and they involve the same two players. Understood in this narrow manner, 
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reciprocity seems not to apply to many instances of hat swaps and role dualism, especially in 
single-iteration games.  
 In response, the notion of reciprocity we have in mind is broader and recognises the 
cooperative effect of explicit and implicit structures and social features surrounding principal-
agent relationships. For example, internal constraints on the part of player 1 (the employee) 
against embezzling funds from a local franchise branch may be met by obligations of player 2 
(the head office HR department) regarding the effective provision of the company’s investments 
in a pension plan. In this case, obligations take place in different domains. Furthermore, the 
employee poses a risk most directly to the local franchise owner, while a different entity (the 
head office HR department) is the reciprocating party. The pension case is an acceptable 
example of reciprocity in our account, because a broader notion of reciprocity permits player 1's 
moral obligation to player 2 in domain X to be reciprocated by player 3's obligation to player 1 
in domain Y so long as players 1, 2, and 3 are implanted in a broadly cooperative setting (e.g. 
due to organisational design involving culture/identity, or temporal design involving repeat 
games). This holds even in single-iteration interactions, because a principal and agent are likely 
to be related and involved in other social interactions prior to, after, or at the same time as their 
one-shot interaction with one another.  
 A second, and potentially devastating, challenge to this article’s argument is as follows: 
some may argue categorically against drawing on principal-agent theory to explain ethics and 
moral obligations in institutional or corporate life. According to this criticism, agency theory is 
incompatible with an adequate theory of moral responsibility. Layers of institutional, 
interpersonal, social, and economic dynamics are left out of a characterisation of ethics that is 
informed by agency theory. Thus, given the dominance of agency theory in applied fields such as 
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corporate governance, relying on the theory to learn about ethics in organisations is arguably 
dangerous.  
In response, cautionary-tale theorists can point out that the principal-agent model 
illuminates only certain, limited aspects of social interactions. The agency approach must then be 
supplemented with an analysis of the special and general obligations that individuals have 
beyond their agency obligations, as well as their explicit role-related, personal, and institutional 
moral obligations, and the legitimate expectations arising from their various commitments. Thus, 
although moral observations regarding principal-agent relations fall far short of constituting a 
complete account of ethics, they are nonetheless an important part of the multifaceted set of 
ethically relevant considerations in social interactions (Buchanan, 1992: 420-421). This article 
has argued that this part can be extended to include a bilateral as opposed to a unilateral lens. 
Crucially, we have steered clear of debates about the content of moral obligations, and have 
focused instead on the contours or structure of ethics in agency theory. This minimalist structural 
extension from unilateralism to bilateralism is morally significant, since it involves 
encompassing not just loyalty but also reciprocity as an essential deontic constraint that can be 
informed by the cautionary-tale view of agency theory. 
 A final challenge remains. In recent years, a slew of social-scientific research outside the 
field of business ethics has revealed empirical evidence indicating the presence of the norm of 
reciprocity as an underlying motivational assumption (see footnote vii). In response to this 
research, economists have developed more advanced theories that are superior to agency theory 
in incorporating social norms and modelling deontic significance. For example, mechanism 
theory treats institutions as games designed to evoke particular kinds of play, e.g. honest 
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reporting, audit efforts, cooperation in teams, etc. In the face of the state of the art of empirical 
and game-theoretic literature, why bother reexamining the cautionary-tale view?  
While this is an important challenge, it is not a reason not to engage with agency theory. 
This article’s constructive treatment and evaluation of agency theory is important and pertinent, 
not because agency is the newest game-theoretic tool on offer by economists, or because 
business ethicists have not criticised agency theory enough already; rather, we work with the 
cautionary-tale view because agency theory continues to be among the most dominant and 
widely-used theories in the study of organisation and management. Unlike the business ethics 
critics who opt to reject agency theory outright, this article accepts and progressively engages 
with this reality.  
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